Idealismo:

O Idealismo é uma corrente filosófica que emergiu apenas com ao advento da modernidade, uma vez que a posição central da subjectividade é fundamental. Seu oposto é o materialismo.

Tendo suas origens a partir da revolução filosófica iniciada por Descartes e o seu cogito, é nos pensadores alemães que o Idealismo está em geral associado, desde Kant até Hegel, que seria talvez o último grande idealista da modernidade. Muitos, ainda, acreditam que a teoria das idéias de Platão é historicamente o primeiro dos idealismos, em que a verdadeira realidade está no mundo das idéias, das formas inteligíveis, acessíveis apenas à razão.

Definição de idealismo

É muito difícil resumir o pensamento idealista, uma vez que há divergências de perspectivas teóricas entre os filósofos idealistas. De todo modo, podemos considerar primado do EU subjetivo como central em todo idealismo, o que não significa necessariamente reduzir a realidade ao pensamento. Assim, na filosofia idealista, o postulado básico é que Eu sou Eu, no sentido de que o Eu é objecto para mim (Eu). Ou seja, a velha oposição entre sujeito e objecto se revela no idealismo como incidente no interior do próprio eu, uma vez que o próprio Eu é o objecto para o sujeito (Eu). “O idealismo tem elementos em comum com o preconceito, ou seja, sempre pensar no ideal. Mas na sociedade humana não deveria existir ‘o ideal’, pois todos nós somos diferentes e isso faz a evolução da sociedade ser maior. O ideal, então, é a mistura das diferenças”, segundo Rodrigo Silva Ferreira. s.m. (1833 RevPhil 62)

1. fil. Qualquer teoria filosófica em que o mundo material, objetivo, exterior só pode ser compreendido plenamente a partir de sua verdade espiritual, mental ou subjetiva. Seus opostos seriam representados pelo realismo (‘na filosofia moderna’) e materialismo;
   1. fil. No sentido ontológico, doutrina filosófica, cujo exemplo mais conhecido é o platonismo, segundo a qual a realidade apresenta uma natureza essencialmente espiritual, sendo a matéria uma manifestação ilusória, aparente, incompleta, ou mera imitação imperfeita de uma matriz original constituída de formas ideais inteligíveis e intangíveis;
   2. p.ext. fil. No sentido gnosiológico, tal como ocorre esp. no kantismo, teoria que considera o sentido e a inteligibilidade de um objeto de conhecimento dependente do sujeito que o compreende, o que torna a realidade cognoscível heterônoma, carente de auto-suficiência, e necessariamente redutível aos termos ou formas ideais que caracterizam a subjetividade humana;
   3. p.ext. ét. No âmbito prático, cujo exemplo mais notório é o da ética kantiana, doutrina que supõe o caráter fundamental dos ideais de conduta como guias da ação humana, a despeito de uma possível ausência de exeqüibilidade integral ou verificabilidade empírica em tais prescrições morais.
2. Propensão a idealizar a realidade ou a deixar-se guiar mais por ideais do que por considerações práticas;
3. estét. lit. Teoria ou prática que valoriza mais a imaginação do que a cópia fiel da natureza. Seu oposto seria o realismo.

Idealismo absoluto: Doutrina idealista inerente ao hegelianismo, caracterizada pela suposição de que a única realidade plena e concreta é de natureza espiritual, sendo a compreensão materialística ou sensível dos objectos um estágio pouco evoluído e superável no paulatino desenvolvimento cognitivo da subjectividade humana.
Idealismo dogmático: Idealismo, especialmente o berkelianismo, que se caracteriza por negar a existência dos objetos exteriores à subjetividade humana [Termo cunhado pelo filósofo alemão Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) para designar uma orientação idealista com a qual não concorda.]. Seu oposto seria o idealismo transcendental.
Idealismo imaterialista: Idealismo defendido por Berkeley (1685-1753) que, partindo de uma perspectiva empirista, na qual a realidade se confunde com aquilo que dela se percebe, conclui que os objetos materiais reduzem-se a idéias na mente de Deus e dos seres humanos; berkelianismo, imaterialismo.
Idealismo transcendental (também chamado formal ou crítico): Doutrina kantiana, segundo a qual os fenômenos da realidade objectiva, por serem incapazes de se mostrar aos homens exactamente tais como são, não aparecem como coisas-em-si, mas como representações subjectivas construídas pelas faculdades humanas de cognição. Seu oposto seria o idealismo dogmático.
¤ etim fr. idéalisme (1749) ‘sistema filosófico que aproxima do pensamento toda existência’, (1828) ‘concepção estética na qual se deve buscar a expressão do ideal acima do real’, (1863) ‘atitude que consiste em subordinar o pensamento e a conduta a um ideal’, do fr. idéal + -isme; cp. port. ideal + -ismo; ver ide(o)- (Houaiss)

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951):

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (pronounced [ˈluːtvɪk ˈjoːzɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtgənʃtaɪn]) (26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian–British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.

Described by Bertrand Russell as “the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating”, he helped inspire two of the twentieth century’s principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as “…the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations”. Wittgenstein’s influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.

The Tractatus

In a letter to Bertrand Russell from 1919, Wittgenstein says of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:

Now I’m afraid you haven’t really got hold of my main contention to which the whole business of logical propositions is only corollary. The main point is the theory of what can be expressed by propositions, i.e., by language (and, which comes to the same thing, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown; which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy

This corresponds to the Preface where he writes:

The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

Those things that cannot be expressed in words make themselves manifest; Wittgenstein calls them the mystical (6.522). They include everything which is the traditional subject matter of philosophy because what can be said is exhausted by the natural sciences.

4.1 Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)
4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. (The word ‘philosophy’ must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)

So with respect to Frege‘s and Russell‘s efforts in logic (which is part of philosophy) Wittgenstein responds:

4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.
5.132 If p follows from q, I can make an inference from q to p, deduce p from q. The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible justification of the inference. ‘Laws of inference’, which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.

“3.0321 Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot.”

The Vienna Circle, broadly speaking, took this to mean that only empirically verifiable sentences were meaningful, and on these grounds flatly dismissed traditional metaphysical and ethical discourse. This is how Rudolf Carnap reacted to the TLP. He thought the lesson was to conceive of philosophy as a strictly meta-logical task in the service of a scientific epistemology. His project of logical syntax was meant to provide philosophers with formalized rational reconstructions of scientific reasoning such that the difference between pseudo-questions (which are about languages) and genuine scientific questions (which are about the world in a theory-laden sense) would be clearly displayed. Once disputes about a choice of language were recognized as such they could simply be settled pragmatically. This work, in Carnap’s view, was all that was left for philosophers to do after traditional philosophy had been relegated to the realm of nonsense.

Although we may be able to see in the TLP what led Carnap to his ideas, it is pretty clear that this account of philosophy was never quite what Wittgenstein had in mind. This is not very surprising seeing as the two men had decidedly different temperaments and approaches to philosophical problems in general. Carnap was harshly critical of Heidegger, for instance, while Wittgenstein stated that he could “readily think what Heidegger means”, and was sincerely respectful of “the impulse to run up against the limits of language”. In Carnap’s autobiography he notes: “…there was a striking difference between Wittgenstein’s attitude toward philosophical problems and that of Schlick and myself. Our attitude toward philosophical problems was not very different from that which scientists have toward their problems.”

As for Wittgenstein:

His point of view and his attitude toward people and problems, even theoretical problems, were much more similar to those of a creative artist than to those of a scientist; one might almost say, similar to those of a religious prophet or a seer… When finally, sometimes after a prolonged arduous effort, his answers came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly created piece of art or a divine revelation…the impression he made on us was as if insight came to him as through divine inspiration, so that we could not help feeling that any sober rational comment of analysis of it would be a profanation.

Wittgenstein, according to Carnap, “tolerated no critical examination by others” either–an attitude very different from that of analytic philosophers and scientists who assume that facing the doubts and objections of others is an important way of testing their hypotheses.

Knowing this, we should perhaps expect that Carnap’s interpretation of the TLP is incorrect. Carnap is close to Wittgenstein, however, insofar as he detects the importance of paying attention to language in resolving philosophical disputes. He maintains that some disputes are fruitless because we fail to see that they are linguistically superficial; that there are many possible ways of talking about, say, numbers, each of which may have its legitimate use in a different context. The young Wittgenstein would probably have replied to Carnap, however, (as did the elder W.V.O. Quine) that the logical analysis of scientific language is better left to the scientists themselves. His idea in the TLP, after all, was not to turn philosophy into meta-logic, but rather to secure as philosophical everything that lies outside the scope of science and therefore beyond the reach of language. A letter written to Ficker makes Wittgenstein’s own understanding of the scope and goal of the TLP clear:

[T]he point of the book is ethical. I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.

The Tractatus is probably most well known for the logical atomism that Russell himself stressed in it: the picture theory of meaning.

• The world consists of independent atomic facts—existing states of affairs—out of which larger facts are built.
• Language consists of atomic, and then larger-scale propositions that correspond to these facts by sharing the same “logical form”.
• Thought, expressed in language, “pictures” these facts.

On this theory any piece of language that is not representative of some fact, i.e. is not a proposition, is to be classified as nonsense. The Tractatus itself is constructed of such pseudo-propositions, however, as Wittgenstein readily admits:

6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

This leads him to reassert the main point of the book.

7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

Some have chosen to interpret this as deliberate irony, others as outright performative contradiction.

Wittgenstein may be fairly compared in some respects to Immanuel Kant who similarly seeks to delimit the sphere of the ethical and save it from the encroachment of science and theoretical reason. Kant is concerned, like Wittgenstein, with antinomies which point out the limits of language and human thought. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s project is transcendental: he is investigating the conditions of possibility of representation.

In the preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein says “the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive”. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was submitted by Wittgenstein for the degree of PhD upon his return to Cambridge University in 1929. At his oral defense Russell, who was one of his examiners, expressed doubts about Wittgenstein’s ability to express unassailable truths with meaningless sentences.

Wittgenstein might have countered with another line from the preface: “Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts.” What he did reply was harsher still: “Don’t worry, I know you’ll never understand it.”

In his examiner’s report, G.E. Moore stated “It is my personal opinion that Mr. Wittgenstein’s thesis is a work of genius”.^[51] Wittgenstein was awarded his PhD.

Intermediate works

Wittgenstein wrote copiously after his return to Cambridge, and arranged much of his writing into an array of incomplete manuscripts. Some thirty thousand pages existed at the time of his death. Much, but by no means all, of this has been sorted and released in several volumes. During his “middle work” in the 1920s and 1930s, much of his work involved attacks from various angles on the sort of philosophical perfectionism embodied in the Tractatus. Of this work, Wittgenstein published only a single paper, “Remarks on Logical Form,” which was submitted to be read for the Aristotelian Society and published in their proceedings. By the time of the conference, however, Wittgenstein had repudiated the essay as worthless, and gave a talk on the concept of infinity instead. Wittgenstein was increasingly frustrated to find that, although he was not yet ready to publish his work, some other philosophers were beginning to publish essays containing inaccurate presentations of his own views based on their conversations with him. As a result, he published a very brief letter to the journal Mind, taking a recent article by R. B. Braithwaite as a case in point, and asked philosophers to hold off writing about his views until he was himself ready to publish them. Although unpublished, the Blue Book, a set of notes dictated to his class at Cambridge in 1933–1934, contains seeds of Wittgenstein’s later thoughts on language (later developed in the Investigations), and is widely read today as a turning point in his philosophy of language.

Philosophical Investigations

Alongside Tractatus, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (Philosophische Untersuchungen) is his other major work. In 1953, two years after Wittgenstein’s death, the long-awaited book was published in two parts. Most of the 693 numbered paragraphs in Part I were ready for printing in 1946, but Wittgenstein withdrew the manuscript from the publisher. The shorter Part II was added by the editors, G.E.M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees.

Illustration of a “duckrabbit”, discussed in Section XI Part II, Philosophical Investigations

It is difficult to find consensus among interpreters of Wittgenstein’s work, and this is particularly true in the case of the Investigations. Wittgenstein asks the reader to think of language and its uses as a multiplicity of language-games within which the parts of language function and have meaning. As a result of this perspective, many conventional philosophical problems (i.e., what is truth?) become meaningless wordplay.

The conventional view of the task of the philosopher is to solve seemingly intractable problems of philosophy using logical analysis (for example, the problem of free will, the relationship between mind and matter, what the good or the beautiful or the true consist of, and so on). However, Wittgenstein argues that these problems are, in fact, “bewitchments” that arise from philosophers’ misuse of language.

In Wittgenstein’s view, language is inextricably woven into the fabric of life, and as part of that fabric it works relatively unproblematically. Philosophical problems arise when language is forced from its proper home and into a metaphysical environment, where all the familiar and necessary landmarks and contextual clues are absent—removed, perhaps, for what appear to be sound philosophical reasons, but which lead, for Wittgenstein, to the source of the problem. Wittgenstein describes this metaphysical environment as like being on frictionless ice: where the conditions are apparently perfect for a philosophically and logically perfect language (the language of the Tractatus), where all philosophical problems can be solved without the confusing and muddying effects of everyday contexts; but where, just because of the lack of friction, language can in fact do no actual work at all. There is much talk in the Investigations, then, of “idle wheels” and language being “on holiday” or a mere “ornament”, all of which are used to express the idea of what is lacking in philosophical contexts. To resolve the problems encountered there, Wittgenstein argues that philosophers must leave the frictionless ice and return to the “rough ground” of ordinary language in use; that is, philosophers must “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”

In this regard, one can see affinities between Wittgenstein and Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that when concepts grounded in experience are applied outside of the range of possible experience, the result is contradictions and confusion. Thus the second part of the Critique consists of refutations, typically by reductio ad absurdum, of logical proofs of the existence of God and the existence of souls, and attacks on strong notions of infinity and necessity. In this way, Wittgenstein’s objections to applying words outside the contexts in which they have an established meaning mirror Kant’s objections to the non-empirical use of empirical reason.

Three fly-bottles, Central Europe, beginning of the 20th century

Returning to the rough ground of ordinary uses of words is, however, easier said than done. Philosophical problems have the character of depth and run as deep as the forms of language and thought that set philosophers on the road to confusion. Wittgenstein therefore speaks of “illusions”, “bewitchment”, and “conjuring tricks” performed on our thinking by our forms of language, and tries to break their spell by attending to differences between superficially similar aspects of language which he feels lead to this type of confusion. For much of the Investigations, then, Wittgenstein tries to show how philosophers are led away from the ordinary world of language in use by misleading aspects of language itself. He does this by looking at the role language plays in the development of various philosophical problems, to some general problems involving language itself, then at the notions of rules and rule following, and then on to some more specific problems in the philosophy of mind. Throughout these investigations, the style of writing is conversational, with Wittgenstein in turn taking the role of the puzzled philosopher (on either or both sides of traditional philosophical debates), and that of the guide attempting to show the puzzled philosopher the way back: the “way out of the fly bottle.”

Much of the Investigations, then, consists of examples of how philosophical confusion is generated and how, by a close examination of the actual workings of everyday language, the first false steps towards philosophical puzzlement can be avoided. By avoiding these first false steps, philosophical problems themselves simply no longer arise and are therefore dissolved rather than solved. As Wittgenstein puts it, “the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.”

Albert Camus (1913-1960)

Albert Camus (7 November 1913 – 4 January 1960) was an Algerian-born French author, philosopher, and journalist who won the Nobel Prize in 1957. He is often associated with existentialism, but Camus refused this label. On the other hand, as he wrote in his essay The Rebel, his whole life was devoted to opposing the philosophy of nihilism while still delving deeply into individual freedom. In 1949, Camus founded the Group for International Liaisons in the Revolutionary Union Movement, according to the book Albert Camus, une vie by Olivier Todd, a group opposed to some tendencies of the surrealistic movement of André Breton. Camus was the second-youngest recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature (after Rudyard Kipling) when he became the first Africa-born writer to receive the award, in 1957. He is also the shortest-lived of any literature laureate to date, having died in an automobile accident only three years after receiving the award. In an interview in 1945, Camus rejected any ideological associations: “No, I am not an existentialist. Sartre and I are always surprised to see our names linked…”

Solidarity in The Stranger

In The Stranger, Albert Camus characterizes his justification of the absurd through the experiences of a protagonist who simply does not conform to the system. His inherent honesty disturbs the status quo; Meursault’s inability to lie cannot seamlessly integrate him within society and in turn threatens the simple fabrics of human mannerisms expected of a structurally ordered society. Consequently, the punishment for his crime is not decided on the basis of murder, but rather for the startling indifference towards his mother’s recent death. Even after a conflicting spiritual discussion with a pastor inciting Meursault to consider a possible path towards redemption, the latter still refuses to take upon salvation and symbolizes his ultimatum by embracing the “gentle indifference of the world”; an act which only furthers his solidarity with a society incapable of realizing his seemingly inhumane and misanthropic behavior.

Summary of Absurdism

Many writers have written on the Absurd, each with his or her own interpretation of what the Absurd actually is and their own ideas on the importance of the Absurd. For example, Sartre recognizes the absurdity of individual experience, while Kierkegaard explains that the absurdity of certain religious truths prevent us from reaching God rationally. Camus was not the originator of Absurdism and regretted the continued reference to him as a philosopher of the absurd. He shows less and less interest in the Absurd shortly after publishing Le Mythe de Sisyphe (The Myth of Sisyphus). To distinguish Camus’ ideas of the Absurd from those of other philosophers, people sometimes refer to the Paradox of the Absurd, when referring to Camus’ Absurd. His early thoughts on the Absurd appeared in his first collection of essays, L’Envers et l’endroit (The Two Sides Of The Coin) in 1937. Absurd themes appeared with more sophistication in his second collection of essays, Noces (Nuptials), in 1938. In these essays Camus does not offer a philosophical account of the Absurd, or even a definition; rather he reflects on the experience of the Absurd. In 1942 he published the story of a man living an Absurd life as L’Étranger (The Stranger), and in the same year released Le Mythe de Sisyphe (The Myth of Sisyphus), a literary essay on the Absurd. He had also written a play about a Roman Emperor, Caligula, pursuing an Absurd logic. However, the play was not performed until 1945. The turning point in Camus’ attitude to the Absurd occurs in a collection of four letters to an anonymous German friend, written between July 1943 and July 1944. The first was published in the Revue Libre in 1943, the second in the Cahiers de Libération in 1944, and the third in the newspaper Libertés, in 1945. All four letters have been published as Lettres à un ami allemand (Letters to a German Friend) in 1945, and have appeared in the collection Resistance, Rebellion, and Death.

Camus’ ideas on the Absurd

In his essays Camus presented the reader with dualisms: happiness and sadness, dark and light, life and death, etc. His aim was to emphasize the fact that happiness is fleeting and that the human condition is one of mortality. He did this not to be morbid, but to reflect a greater appreciation for life and happiness. In Le Mythe, this dualism becomes a paradox: We value our lives and existence so greatly, but at the same time we know we will eventually die, and ultimately our endeavours are meaningless. While we can live with a dualism (I can accept periods of unhappiness, because I know I will also experience happiness to come), we cannot live with the paradox (I think my life is of great importance, but I also think it is meaningless). In Le Mythe, Camus was interested in how we experience the Absurd and how we live with it. Our life must have meaning for us to value it. If we accept that life has no meaning and therefore no value, should we kill ourselves? Meursault, the Absurdist hero of L’Étranger, is a murderer who is executed for his crime. Caligula ends up admitting his Absurd logic was wrong and is killed by an assassination he has deliberately brought about. However, while Camus possibly suggests that Caligula’s Absurd reasoning is wrong, the play’s anti-hero does get the last word, as the author similarly exalts Meursault’s final moments. Camus’ understanding of the Absurd promotes public debate; his various offerings entice us to think about the Absurd and offer our own contribution. Concepts such as cooperation, joint effort and solidarity are of key importance to Camus. Camus made a significant contribution to a viewpoint of the Absurd, and always rejected nihilism as a valid response.

“If nothing had any meaning, you would be right. But there is something that still has a meaning.” Second Letter to a German Friend, December 1943.

What still had meaning for Camus is that despite humans being subjects in an indifferent and “absurd” universe, in which meaning is challenged by the fact that we all die, meaning can be created, however provisionally and unstably, by our own decisions and interpretations.

Frierich Nietzsche (1844-1900)

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (October 15, 1844 – August 25, 1900) was a nineteenth-century German philosopher and classical philologist. He wrote critical texts on religion, morality, contemporary culture, philosophy, and science, using a distinctive German language style and displaying a fondness for metaphor and aphorism. Nietzsche’s influence remains substantial within and beyond philosophy, notably in existentialism and postmodernism. His style and radical questioning of the value and objectivity of truth have resulted in much commentary and interpretation, mostly in the continental tradition, and some analytic philosophy. His key ideas include interpreting tragedy as an affirmation of life, an eternal recurrence (which numerous commentators have re-interpreted), a rejection of Platonism, and a repudiation of both Christianity and Egalitarianism (especially in the form of Democracy and Socialism).

Nietzsche began his career as a classical philologist before turning to philosophy. At the age of 24 he was appointed to the Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel (the youngest individual ever to have held this position), but resigned in 1879 because of health problems, which would plague him for most of his life. In 1889 he exhibited symptoms of insanity, living out his remaining years in the care of his mother and sister until his death in 1900.

The death of God, nihilism, and perspectivism

The statement “God is dead,” occurring in several of Nietzsche’s works (notably in The Gay Science), has become one of his best-known remarks. On the basis of this remark, most commentators regard Nietzsche as an atheist; others (such as Kaufmann) suggest that this statement reflects a more subtle understanding of divinity. In Nietzsche’s view, recent developments in modern science and the increasing secularization of European society had effectively ‘killed’ the Christian God, who had served as the basis for meaning and value in the West for more than a thousand years.

Nietzsche claimed the ‘death’ of God would eventually lead to the loss of any universal perspective on things, and along with it any coherent sense of objective truth. Instead we would retain only our own multiple, diverse, and fluid perspectives. This view has acquired the name “perspectivism“.

Alternatively, the death of God may lead beyond bare perspectivism to outright nihilism, the belief that nothing has any importance and that life lacks purpose. As Heidegger put the problem, “If God as the suprasensory ground and goal of all reality is dead, if the suprasensory world of the Ideas has suffered the loss of its obligatory and above it its vitalizing and upbuilding power, then nothing more remains to which man can cling and by which he can orient himself.” Developing this idea, Nietzsche wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra, therein introducing the concept of a value-creating Übermensch. According to Lampert, “the death of God must be followed by a long twilight of piety and nihilism (II. 19; III. 8). […] Zarathustra’s gift of the superman is given to a mankind not aware of the problem to which the superman is the solution.”

The Will to Power

An important element of Nietzsche’s philosophical outlook is the “will to power” (der Wille zur Macht), which provides a basis for understanding motivation in human behavior. But this concept may have wider application, as Nietzsche, in a number of places, also suggests that the will to power is a more important element than pressure for adaptation or survival. In its later forms Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power applies to all living things, suggesting that adaptation and the struggle to survive is a secondary drive in the evolution of animals, less important than the desire to expand one’s power. Nietzsche eventually took this concept further still, and transformed the idea of matter as centers of force into matter as centers of will to power. Nietzsche wanted to dispense with the theory of matter, which he viewed as a relic of the metaphysics of substance. One study of Nietzsche defines his fully-developed concept of the will to power as “the element from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and the quality that devolves into each force in this relation” revealing the will to power as “the principle of the synthesis of forces.”

Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power can also be viewed as a response to Schopenhauer‘s “will to live.” Writing a generation before Nietzsche, Schopenhauer had regarded the entire universe and everything in it as driven by a primordial will to live, thus resulting in all creatures’ desire to avoid death and to procreate. Nietzsche, however, challenges Schopenhauer’s account and suggests that people and animals really want power; living in itself appears only as a subsidiary aim — something necessary to promote one’s power. In defense of his view, Nietzsche appeals to many instances in which people and animals willingly risk their lives in order to promote their power, most notably in instances like competitive fighting and warfare. Once again, Nietzsche seems to take part of his inspiration from the ancient Homeric Greek texts he knew well: Greek heroes and aristocrats or “masters” did not desire mere living (they often died quite young and risked their lives in battle) but wanted power, glory, and greatness. In this regard he often mentions the common Greek theme of agon or contest.

In addition to Schopenhauer’s psychological views, Nietzsche contrasts his notion of the will to power with many of the other most popular psychological views of his day, such as utilitarianism, which claims that all people fundamentally want to be happy (Nietzsche responds that only the Englishman wants that), and Platonism, which claims that people ultimately want to achieve unity with the good or in Christian neo-Platonism, with God. In each case, Nietzsche argues that the “will to power” provides a more useful and general explanation of human behavior.

Übermensch

Another concept important to an understanding of Nietzsche’s thought is the Übermensch (variously translated – often without regard to the gender-neutrality of the German word Mensch, which means “human being” – as superman, superhuman, or overman). While interpretations of Nietzsche’s overman vary wildly, here are a few of his quotes from Thus Spoke Zarathustra:

I teach you the overman. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? […] All beings so far have created something beyond themselves; and do you want to be the ebb of this great flood, and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome man? What is ape to man? A laughing stock or painful embarrassment. And man shall be that to overman: a laughingstock or painful embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even now, too, man is more ape than any ape…The overman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth…Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman–a rope over an abyss…what is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end…”

Lógica

Estudei a lógica na idade de 17 anos e gostei muito. Não me esqueci ainda de modos de silogismo.

Eis os modos da primeira figura directa: Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio.

Modos da primeira figura indirecta: Baralipton, Celantes, Dabitis, Fapesmo, Frisesomorum.

Modos da segunda figura : Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco.

Modos da terceira figura : Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Ferison.

Sofismas: Equívoco, anfibologia, falácia da composição, falácia da divisão, falácia do acento, figura da dicção. Também, falácia do acidente, falácia da contradicção, petition principii, falácia do consequente, falácia de interrogações.

Falácia

Da Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre.

Uma falácia é um argumento logicamente inconsistente, inválido, ou falho na capacidade de provar eficazmente o que alega. Argumentos que se destinam à persuasão podem parecer convincentes para grande parte do público apesar de conterem falácias, mas não deixam de ser falsos por causa disso. Reconhecer as falácias é por vezes difícil. Os argumentos falaciosos podem ter validade emocional, íntima, psicológica ou emotiva, mas não validade lógica.

É importante conhecer os tipos de falácia para evitar armadilhas lógicas na própria argumentação e para analisar a argumentação alheia.

Tipologia das falácias – com exemplos

• Argumentum ad antiquitatem (Argumento de antiguidade ou tradição):

Afirmar que algo é verdadeiro ou bom porque é antigo ou “sempre foi assim”.

Ex: “Se o meu avô diz que Garrincha foi melhor que Pelé, deve ser verdade.”

• Argumentum ad hominem (Ataque ao argumentador):

Em vez de o argumentador provar a falsidade do enunciado, ele ataca a pessoa que fez o enunciado.

Ex: “Se foi um burguês quem disse isso, certamente é engodo”.

• Argumentum ad ignorantiam (Argumento da Ignorância):

Ocorre quando algo é considerado verdadeiro simplesmente porque não foi provado que é falso (ou provar que algo é falso por não haver provas de que seja verdade). Note que é diferente do princípio científico de se considerar falso até que seja provado que é verdadeiro.

Ex: “Existe vida em outro planeta, pois nunca provaram o contrário”

• Non sequitur (Não segue):

Tipo de falácia na qual a conclusão não se sustenta nas premissas. Há uma violação da coerência textual.

Ex: “Que nome complicado tem este futebolista. Deve jogar muita bola!”

• Argumentum ad Baculum (Apelo à Força):

Utilização de algum tipo de privilégio, força, poder ou ameaça para impor a conclusão.

Ex: “Acredite em Deus, senão queimará eternamente no Inferno.”

“Acredite no que eu digo; não se esqueça de quem é que paga o seu salário”

• Argumentum ad populum (Apelo ao Povo):

É a tentativa de ganhar a causa por apelar a uma grande quantidade de pessoas.

Ex: “A maioria das pessoas acredita em alienígenas, portanto eles existem.”

“Inúmeras pessoas usam essa marca de roupa; portanto, ela possui um tecido de melhor qualidade.”

• Argumentum ad Verecundiam (Apelo à autoridade):

Argumentação baseada no apelo a alguma autoridade reconhecida para comprovar a premissa.

Ex: “Se Aristóteles disse isto, então é verdade.”

• Dicto Simpliciter’ (Regra geral):

Ocorre quando uma regra geral é aplicada a um caso particular onde a regra não deveria ser aplicada.

Ex: “Se você matou alguém, deve ir para a cadeia.” (não se aplica a certos casos de profissionais de segurança)

• Generalização Apressada (Falsa indução):

É o oposto do Dicto Simpliciter. Ocorre quando uma regra específica é atribuída ao caso genérico.

Ex: “Minha namorada me traiu. Logo, as mulheres tendem à traição.”

• Falácia de Composição (Tomar o todo pela parte):

É o fato de concluir que uma propriedade das partes deve ser aplicada ao todo.

Ex: “Todas as peças deste caminhão são leves; logo, o caminhão é leve.”

• Falácia da Divisão (Tomar a parte pelo todo):

Oposto da falácia de composição. Assume que uma propriedade do todo é aplicada a cada parte.

Ex: 1) “Você deve ser rico, pois estuda em um colégio de ricos.”

2) “A ONU afirmou que o Brasil é um país com muita violência e injustiça; logo, a ONU chamou-nos a todos nós brasileiros de violentos e injustos”.

• Falácia do homem de palha:

Consiste em criar idéias reprováveis ou fracas, atribuindo-as à posição oposta.

Ex: “Deveríamos abolir todas as armas do mundo. Só assim haveria paz verdadeira.” Ou ainda, “Meu adversário, por ser de um partido de esquerda, é a favor do comunismo radical, e quer retirar todas as suas posses, além de ocupar as suas casas com pessoas que você não conhece.”

• Cum hoc ergo propter hoc : (falsa causa)

Afirma que apenas porque dois eventos ocorreram juntos eles estão relacionados.

Ex: “O Guarani vai ganhar o jogo de hoje porque hoje é quinta-feira e até agora ele ganhou em todas as quintas-feiras em que jogou.”

• Post hoc ergo propter hoc :

Consiste em dizer que, pelo simples fato de um evento ter ocorrido logo após o outro, eles têm uma relação de causa e efeito.

Ex: “O Japão rendeu-se logo após a utilização das bombas atômicas por parte dos EUA. Portanto, a paz foi alcançada devido à utilização das armas nucleares.”

• Petitio Principii :

Ocorre quando as premissas são tão questionáveis quanto a conclusão alcançada.

Ex: “Sócrates tentou corromper a juventude da Grécia, logo foi justo condená-lo à morte.”

• Circulus in Demonstrando :

Ocorre quando alguém assume como premissa a conclusão a que se quer chegar.

Ex: “Sabemos que Joãozinho diz a verdade pois muitas pessoas dizem isso. E sabemos que Joãozinho diz a verdade pois nós o conhecemos.”

• Falácia da Pressuposição :

Consiste na inclusão de uma pressuposição que não foi previamente esclarecida como verdadeira, ou seja, na falta de uma premissa.

Ex: “Você já parou de bater na sua esposa?”

• Ignoratio Elenchi (Conclusão sofismática):

Ou “Falácia da Conclusão Irrelevante”. Consiste em utilizar argumentos válidos para chegar a uma conclusão que não tem relação alguma com os argumentos utilizados.

Ex: “Os astronautas do Projeto Apollo eram bem preparados, todos eram excelentes aviadores e tinham boa formação acadêmica e intelectual, além de apresentar boas condições físicas. Logo, foi um processo natural os EUA ganharem a corrida espacial contra a União Soviética pois o povo americano é superior ao povo russo.”

• Anfibologia ou Ambigüidade:

Ocorre quando as premissas usadas no argumento são ambíguas devido à má elaboração sintática.

Ex: “Venceu o Brasil a Argentina.”

“Ele levou o pai ao médico em seu carro.”

• Acentuação :

É uma forma de falácia devido à mudança de significado pela entonação. O significado é mudado dependendo da ênfase das palavras.

Ex: compare: “Não devemos falar MAL dos nossos amigos.” com: “Não devemos falar mal dos nossos AMIGOS“.

• Acidente:

Quando considera-se essencial o que é apenas acidental.

Ex: “A maior parte dos políticos são corruptos. Então a política é corrupta.”

• Falácias tipo “A” baseado em “B” (Outro tipo de Conclusão Sofismática) :

Ocorrem dois fatos. São colocados como similares por serem derivados ou similares a um terceiro fato.

Ex:

1. “O Islamismo é baseado na fé.”
2. “O Cristianismo é baseado na fé.”
3. “Logo o islamismo é similar ao cristianismo.”

• Falácia da afirmação do consequente :

Esta falácia ocorre quando se tenta construir um argumento condicional que não está nem do Modus ponens (afirmação do antecedente) nem no Modus Tollens (negação do conseqüente). A sua forma categórica é:

Se A então B.
B              
Então A.

Ex: “Se há carros então há poluição. Há poluição. Logo, há carros.”

• Falácia da negação do antecedente :

Esta falácia ocorre quando se tenta construir um argumento condicional que não está nem do Modus ponens (afirmação do antecedente) nem no Modus Tollens (negação do consequente). A sua forma categórica é:

Se A então B.
Não A          
Então não B.

Ex: “Se há carros então há poluição. Não há carros. Logo, não há poluição.”

• Falsa dicotomia (bifurcação):

Também conhecida como “falácia do branco e preto”. Ocorre quando alguém apresenta uma situação com apenas duas alternativas, quando de fato outras alternativas existem ou podem existir.

Ex: “Se você não está a favor de de mim então está contra mim.”

• Argumentum ad Crumenam :

Esta falácia é a de acreditar que dinheiro é fator de estar correto. Aqueles mais ricos são os que provavelmente estão certos.

Ex: “O Barão é um homem vivido e conhece como as coisas funcionam. Se ele diz que é bom, há de ser.”

• Argumentum ad Lazarum :

Oposto ao “ad Crumenam”. Esta é a falácia de assumir que apenas porque alguém é mais pobre, então é mais virtuoso e verdadeiro.

Ex: “Joãozinho é pobre e deve ter sofrido muito na vida. Se ele diz que isso é uma cilada, eu acredito.”

• Argumentum ad Nauseam :

É a aplicação da repetição constante e a crença incorreta de que quanto mais se diz algo, mais correto está.

Ex: “Se Joãozinho diz tanto que sua ex-namorada é uma mentirosa, então ela é.”

• Plurium Interrogationum :

Ocorre quando se exige uma resposta simples a uma questão complexa.

Ex: “O que faremos com esse criminoso? Matar ou prender?”

• Red Herring :

Falácia cometida quando material irrelevante é introduzido no assunto discutido para desviar a atenção e chegar a uma conclusão diferente.

Ex: “Será que o palhaço é o assassino? No ano passado um palhaço matou uma criança.”

• Retificação :

Ocorre quando um conceito abstrato é tratado como coisa concreta.

Ex: “A tristeza de Joãozinho é a culpada por tudo.”

• Tu Quoque (Você Também):

Falácia do “mas você também”. Ocorre quando uma ação se torna aceitável pois outra pessoa também a cometeu.

Ex:

1. “Você está sendo abusivo.”
2. “E daí? Você também está.”

• Inversão do Ônus da Prova :

Quando o argumentador transfere ao seu opositor a responsabilidade de comprovar o argumento contrário, eximindo-se de provar a base do seu argumento.

Ex: “A Fada-do-Dente existe, pois ninguém nunca conseguiu provar que ela não existe.